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Abstract 
Enlargement of the European Union and the globalization process significantly affect tax 
systems and fiscal policies of individual countries. The level and structure of tax burden is 
often discussed in the European Union, as well as what is more profitable – keeping tax 
competition or tax harmonization. Tax environment and tax burden are significant factors 
when deciding about investment allocation. For international comparison, the easiest way is to 
use statutory tax rates but the result may be rather inaccurate. More convenient way of 
comparison is comparing implicit rates where we may express impact of taxes on economic 
activities according to their functions. The paper first summarizes basic theoretic approaches 
to tax competition. Then it is followed by an analysis of level and structure of tax burden in 
the European Union in the period of 1995 to 2006. There is emphasis on the dissimilarity of 
results depending on the type of tax rates used, namely statutory and implicit. The aim is to 
verify the hypothesis that value of tax burden (measured by tax quota) falls in time and that 
indirect taxes outweigh direct taxes in the tax burden of the European Union.  
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1. Introduction 
Tax burden has always been and always will be a subject of expert and lay discussions 
as it concerns every citizen as an individual living in the given country and it is also a 
significant factor for investors. Every state—in order to fulfill its basic functions—must 
concentrate financial means in the form of public revenues. With growing globalization and 
internationalization, the level of tax burden is also discussed, as well as what is more 
profitable – keeping tax competition or tax harmonization. Although there are various 
opinions on taxes and level of tax burden, tax revenues usually remain the most significant 
income of public budgets. To put it in a simplified way, in the field of taxes we evaluate 
positively everything that makes it easy for free movement of goods, services, persons and 
capital within the single internal market as well as those things that correspond to principles 
of optimal taxation.  
The paper first summarizes basic theoretic approaches to tax competition. The analysis 
is based on work with expert studies published so far. It is followed by an analysis of tax 
burden in the European Union in the period of 1995 to 2006. There is emphasis on the 
dissimilarity of results depending on the type of tax rates used, namely statutory and implicit. 
The aim is to verify the hypothesis that value of tax burden (measured by tax quota) falls in 
time and that indirect taxes outweigh direct taxes in the tax burden. The primary source of 
data is publication Taxation trends in the EU published by the European Commission (2008). 
This report contains a detailed statistical analysis of the tax systems of the member states of 
the European Union. 
2. Economic Theory and Tax Competition  
In economic theory there are two basic opinions of level of tax burden and approaches 
to tax competition, namely: 
• positive—putting an emphasis on so-called tax game; 
• negative—claiming that tax competition is actually harmful because decrease 
in tax revenues leads to providing public estates lower than the socially optimal level1.  
Followers of the first trend  - like Tiebout (1956, pp. 416-424) - claim that tax 
competition is an optimal conception for organization of tax systems and leads to increase in 
wealth of all individuals in the society as it has positive effects on economic growth of 
individual countries, on more effective allocation of resources, on increasing efficiency of 
government activities and public expenditures and more effective providing of public estates 
and services. Positive evaluation of tax competition is mainly connected to more effective use 
of public resources and limiting non-productive activities, such as rent-seeking that are linked 
with the decision-making in the public sector. The stream starting with Tiebout theorem 
claims that competition enlarged by mobile households (or mobile companies) increases 
wealth of the society and thus, it is effective. Tax competition lies in the idea that government 
must have taxes low enough in order to attract sufficient number of citizens (or companies) 
but at the same time to provide sufficiency of public estates2, otherwise citizens use the choice 
of “voting with the feet” and move to an area that is more convenient for them.  
On the contrary, according to Stiglitz (1997), there are many reasons to be skeptical of 
this hypothesis. The main reason lies in his limited fiscal competition between units, because 
their number is limited in each division, and other authors also argue that in reality is "voting 
with the feet" difficult, since there are language barriers, administrative, family ties, etc. It is 
also necessary to mention the fact that the collected taxes (property, local, income and sales 
taxes) make distorsion effects, which can together with externalities lead to inefficiencies of 
allocation decisions at local level. 
Tiebout´s  hypothesis further elaborated Richter and Wellisch (1996, pp. 73-93), when 
extended model of so-called mobile companies, which may behave similarly and also can 
"vote with their feet“. From this perspective, the concept of tax competition is positive and 
there is no reason to change it.  
On the other hand the representatives of the second trend - such as Oates (1973, pp. 
188-191) - claim that tax competition is basically harmful as the decrease of tax revenues 
leads to providing public estates lower than the socially optimal level. This approach mainly 
                                                 
1
 For details see Szarowská (2009) 
2
 One of the reasons should be mechanism of decision of a voter, taxpayer and citizen of a certain region (town 
or village) according to their real preferences towards public estates on the one hand, and according to their will 
to pay taxes (local) on the other hand. Tiebout´s hypothesis assumes competitiveness and competition between 
communities when finding citizens´ preferences. 
  
examines the impact of capital mobility on the level and structure of tax rates. The authors 
emphasize negative impact of capital mobility on tax rates of capital and level of public 
expenditures. 
Also Grifith and Klemm (2004) confirm that tax competition may lead to a "race to the 
bottom" and the lack of provision of public goods and services from the state - the result is the 
sacrifice of welfare state, and illustrate their argument using the example of countries such as 
France, Germany and Sweden, which are due to existing tax competition forced in recent 
years to reduce the scope of the "welfare state". 
More generally, the question of tax competition between governments and its impact 
conceived as a question of size of the state of the economy, the size of the different levels of 
power, to the extent desired redistribution processes. These two opposing views concerning 
the issues of tax competition between different degrees of economic integration, including 
integration in the European Union. Oates points out that the result of tax competition may be a 
tendency towards ever-lower efficiency provision of local public goods. Reduced if the local 
government taxes to attract mobile capital, public expenditures below the level where the 
marginal social benefits of these programs equal marginal costs. This can occur especially in 
programs that do not directly benefit the local business climate. Oates concluded that such 
conduct is inefficient governments, is based on the argument that no government eventually 
fails to win this fight competitive advantage (principle of prisoner's dilemma). Result of tax 
competition, therefore, is that all communities are worse off than if the political leaders used 
the normal maximization rule (the marginal benefits equal marginal costs). 
Other sources indicate that competition among governments may lead to the fact that 
the government stop providing certain public goods. As points Wilson (1999, pp. 269-304), 
concept of "harmful" tax competition to attract investment was later applied to labor and 
environmental standards, reducing social security and competition in indirect taxes on cross-
border consumer . Oates´s concept of harmful tax competition was supported by a number of 
models that describe the consequences of behavior noncooperating regional governments. The 
success of any single government in attracting the tax base in the form of new residents and 
businesses leads to erosion of the tax base in other regions. The resulting negative fiscal 
externalities are reflected in particular in export tax when the government taxed income non-
residents, or erosion of the tax base, thus moving the actual economic activity in tax-favorable 
sites, respectively transfer declaration profits. 
The opinions and concerns of insufficient amount of public expenditures may be 
opposed with data stated in Table 1. Even though there has been tax competition not only in 
Europe and there could be pressure on decrease of expenditures for the reason of insufficient 
amount of public revenues, total expenditures of the public sector have not decreased, on the 
contrary—since 1870 they have noticeably increased. 
Table 1 Growth of General Government Expenditure in % of GDP (1870 – 2007) 
  1870 1913 1920 1937 1960 1980 1990 1996 2007 
Austria 10.5 17 14.7 20.6 35.7 48.1 38.6 51.6 49.7 
France 12.6 17 27.6 29 34.6 46.1 49.8 55 53 
Germany 10 14.8 25 34.1 32.4 47.9 45.1 49.1 44.3 
Japan 8.8 8.3 14.8 25.4 17.5 32 31.3 35.9 36.5 
Norway 5.9 9.3 16 11.8 29.9 43.8 54.9 49.2 41 
Sweden 5.7 10.4 10.9 16.5 31 60.1 59.1 64.2 53.8 
UK 9.4 12.7 26.2 30 32.2 43 39.9 43 44.6 
USA 7.3 7.5 12.1 19.7 27 31.4 32.8 32.4 37.4 
Average 8.775 12.125 18.413 23.388 30.038 44.05 43.938 47.55 45.0375 
Source: The author´s own compilation according to OECD data and Tanzi, V., Schuknecht, L. 
(2000, p.6) 
New member states are often criticised for their “tax-friendly policies” which is 
usually proven by lower rates as well as by total revenues mainly from taxation of companies´ 
profits. However, Kubátová (2008) opposes that motivation for changes in tax rates in these 
countries is not to get competition advantage or to adapt to surrounding countries, but the 
effort to “fill” public budgets. 
Based on the above mentioned theories we may ask whether tax decrease (which is 
usually a result of tax competition effect) really always means decrease of tax collection.  
Figure 1 Average corporate tax rates and revenues in EU-15 (1980−2005) 
 
 
Source: Ganghof, S., Genschel, P. (2007, p. 6)  
The Figure 1 shows relation between amount of average corporate tax and revenues of 
state budget in the countries of the EU-15 in the period from 1980 to 2005, proves that it is 
not the case. It is apparent that in spite of significant decrease of rates there was no decrease 
of tax revenue, but quite the contrary—it increased, and this development may be interpreted 
as application of concept of Laffer curve3  in practice. 
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 Laffer curve expresses dependence of tax revenue on rate of taxation (or tax rate). It proves that maximum rate 
of taxation does not mean maximum revenue of public budgets. When increasing rate of taxation, tax revenue 
only increases up to a certain point (Laffer point), and when increasing the rate of taxation further, tax revenue 
begins to fall. That is, if rate of taxation (tax rates) is too high, tax subjects are discouraged from increase in 
performance, work and savings, or they move their adresses outside the given state, which means decrease of tax 
revenue in the end. 
 
It is not possible to unambiguously confirm or to disprove the usefulness or 
harmfulness of tax competition, either theoretically or empirically. However, it should be 
emphasized that tax competition is not deliberately or artificially created but it is a result of 
unsuccessful harmonization negotiations and it results from various types of tax systems of 
individual countries.  
3. European Union approach to taxation and tax competition 
Enlargement of the European Union and the globalization process significantly affect 
tax systems and fiscal policies of Member States. At the moment the European Union (EU) 
includes twenty-seven member states. As it proclaims, its functioning is connected to the 
single internal market, which is defined as area without inner borders and within this area 
there are four kinds of freedom ensured, i.e. free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital4. Member states of the EU have independent tax systems and use independent tax 
policies. To the presented aims of tax policy of the European Union count support of 
harmonic development of economic activities, continuous and balanced development, 
increasing stability, growth of living standard and close collaboration of member states. The 
aim or effort of the European Union is not to unify national systems of taxes and 
contributions, but to ensure their mutual comparability in accordance to accepted contracts 
established in the European Union5. The result is twenty-seven tax systems and systems of 
taxation, whose configurations result from various economic, sociological, historical and 
other factors. With the growing globalization and internalization there are more and more 
discussions about what is more profitable – keeping tax competition or effort to reach tax 
harmonization.  
Nowadays there are boundaries for individual types of taxes determined in the EU as 
follows:  
• personal incomes taxes remain in the authority of national governments; 
• indirect taxes—directly affecting functioning of the single market—attract a lot 
of attention and efforts to be harmonized;  
• corporate taxes should help free movement of capital and should not cause 
harmful competition between individual states;  
• social and pension systems should eliminate discrimination of residents of 
individual states and should not be an obstacle of free settling and investing in 
any member state of the European Union. 
Current tax policy of the EU is focused on harmonization of indirect tax rates (VAT 
and excise taxes) that may directly affect the market. In the field of direct taxes, tax 
competition between individual states is noticable in spite of effort to harmonize them. Thus 
functioning of the single market in the European Union is disturbed by many problems related 
to business activities realized across the borders of individual member states. Apart from 
other things, the reason is substantial dissimilarity of tax systems used in member states and 
related dissimilarity of effective tax burden of business units in individual member states. 
This mainly applies to incomes and property taxes and obligatory payments to social welfare. 
The existing situation is caused not only by fiscal reasons but it is caused deliberately in many 
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 Široký (2009, p. 21). 
5
 Tax policy belongs to policies with shared authority. Member states may issue their own legislation only when 
there is no common European arrangement, possibly as its amendment. Tax practice is more or less a summary 
of factually independent tax policies of individual member states of the EU. 
cases with the aim to attract foreign capital to develop business activities in the given state by 
favourable tax regime. 
4. Tax Burden and its Measuring  
Tax is an obligatory amount determined by law in advance, by which a part of nominal 
income is taken away from a tax subject on the non-refundable principle. 
The question is what rates or values should be the tax burden comparison based on. 
The easiest choice is comparison of statutory tax rates as a statutory tax rate is the legally 
imposed rate. This comparison is often used because of its simplicity and good availability of 
data. It is commonly used for comparing incomes and excise taxes. However, we must pay 
attention to the fact that statutory tax rates may include not only so-called nominal tax rates 
but also temporary or permanent complementary rates or allowances and moreover, in a great 
number of states taxes are collected on more levels of governments. Thus their organization 
may vary in the countries.  Therefore, statutory tax rates may not be an objective indicator for 
the purposes of mutual international comparison.  
4.1 Implicit Tax Rates 
An appropriate standard for comparison of effective taxation seems to be implicit 
rates, which are tax rates that consider not only size of statutory tax rates but also other 
aspects of tax systems determining total amount of effectively paid taxes (for example 
differently constructed tax base). Implicit tax rates are calculated in order to provide better 
information on the tax burden on an economic activity. 
Implicit tax rate (ITR) = T / Y x 100 [%] 
Where T is tax duty and Y is gross income from which tax is counted. 
It is obvious that no tax rate will be consistent with ITR in case when a tax allowance 
is included in tax construction (non-taxable part of tax base or deductible item) or tax relief. 
Comparison of statutory and implicit tax rates shows tax incentives provided by authorities in 
individual countries; comparison of implicit tax rates across individual states provides 
indications whether there are significantly dissimilar tax approaches to companies with the 
same characteristics but located in various countries.  Such data may prove whether great 
differences of statutory tax rates do not only hide minor differences in implicit taxation, as 
countries with high statutory tax rates may decrease size of tax base or soften tax 
enforceability.  
Eurostat has used implicit tax rates for evaluation of structure of a tax system since 
1995. In this way, we may express impact of taxes on economic activities according to their 
functions (work, capital, consumption).  
4.1.1 Labour Implicit Tax Rate 
Labour implicit tax rate represents a proportion of taxes and statutory insurance (paid from 
labour incomes by employers as well as employees) to total labour costs (total volume of 
compensations paid to employees on the territory of the given state including possible taxes 
from earnings excluding tax revenues from social transfers).  
ITRlabour =  Taxes on labour / (compensation of employees + wage bill and payroll taxes) 
 
Figure 2 Labour Implicit Tax Rate in % GDP (2006) 
 
Source: The author´s own compilation based on data from Eurostat    
The highest labour tax burden is in Sweden, followed by Italy and Belgium. Generally, 
labour tax burden is steady in the European Union, and higher burden may be found 
especially in the countries of the original EU-15. According to the data of 2006, the Czech 
Republic is the seventh most expensive country of the whole European Union. 
4.1.2 Capital Implicit Tax Rate 
Tax environment is a significant factor for investors when deciding about allocation of 
their investments. Despite harmonization efforts of the European Union there is a hot tax 
competition in the area of these taxes regarding to high mobility of capital. The existing 
situation is caused not only by fiscal reasons but also by efforts to attract foreign capital by 
favourable tax regime. Capital implicit tax rate is calculated as proportion of collection of 
taxes from revenues of savings and investments of households and companies to volume of 
worldwide revenues from capital and enterprise of domestic tax residents that is liable to 
domestic taxation. When comparing values and development of capital implicit tax rates there 
are great differences between member states of the EU. In general terms, the (overall) ITR on 
capital can be defined as follows: 
ITRcapital = Taxes on capital income / potentially taxable capital income 
 
Figure 3 Capital Implicit Tax Rate  in % GDP (2006)  
 
Source: The author´s own compilation based on data from Eurostat    
At one end there is Spain and Ireland where there was significant increase of capital 
implicit tax rate in the monitored period (by 18.5 per cent and 16.8 per cent respectively), at 
the other end there is Estonia and Slovakia where there was a great decrease in connection to 
introduction of equal tax (by 17.2 per cent in both countries). Estonia is by far a country with 
the lowest capital implicit tax rate (8.4 per cent), on the other side of the scale there is Ireland 
(42.5 per cent) and France (41.5 per cent). 
4.1.3 Consumption Implicit Tax Rate 
Taxes on consumption are defined as taxes levied on final consumption goods. 
Consumption implicit tax rate is calculated as proportion between total revenues from taxes 
from consumption (for example in the Czech Republic mainly VAT and excise taxes) and 
total final costs of households of consumption on the territory of the given state.  
ITRconsumption =  Taxes on consumption / final consumption expenditure of households  
Figure 4 Consumption Implicit Tax Rate  in % GDP (2006) 
 
Source: The author´s own compilation based on data from Eurostat    
In 2006 the consumption implicit tax rate in the Czech Republic was 21.2 per cent, 
which is almost one per cent below the average value of the EU-27 (22.1 per cent), value of 
the rate in Poland was still one per cent below the rate in the Czech Republic. In the implicit 
consumption tax burden there are not such great differences as it applies for other types of 
taxation. One of the reasons is probably fact that consumption is easier to be taxed, even if the 
payment moral is lower.  
4.1.4 Implicit Tax Rates in the EU – Summary 
The last graph summarizes what current trends there are in the tax policy of the 
European Union. It is obvious from the graph that in the EU the labour implicit tax rate is 
higher than capital and consumption tax rates. Labour is taxed above average especially 
because it is not much mobile, compared to other production factors. The capital implicit tax 
rate does not fall, but it tends to rise in the long term in spite of decreasing nominal rates. The 
reason for this is expansion of tax base and partially the impact of fight against tax evasions. 
The lowest is the consumption implicit taxation when the reasons may be social reasons as 
well as the fact that consumption is easier to be taxed and possibility of tax evasion is lower 
than in case of more mobile tax bases - labour and capital.  
Figure 5 Implicit tax rates in EU in % GDP (1995 –2007)  
 
Note: calculation used arithmetic average data 
Source: The author´s own compilation based on data from Eurostat    
4.2 Tax Quota 
As already mentioned, international comparison of actual taxes does not say much 
with regard to different construction of taxes in individual countries. Level of tax rate is only 
one of the variables. Resulting values substantially affect differently constructed tax bases, 
from which the tax is calculated, as well as systems of exceptions and deductible items that 
vary in every country. As recommends Kubátová (2005, 142-50) for international comparison 
of tax burden we may use a tax quota . This is a macroeconomic indicator that is calculated as 
“proportion of tax and duty revenue and to GDP” in current prices. 
Tax quota = tax revenues / GDP * 100 [%] 
It actually represents a proportion of gross domestic product that is redistributed by 
means of public budgets. As it uses data of really collected tax revenues to GDP, it provides 
information about value of total effective taxation in the given country. Depending on the 
“extent” of numerator (i.e. “extent” of public revenues considered), there is a simple and a 
compound (sometimes called overall) tax quota. Simple tax quota includes only those 
incomes of public budgets that are really labelled as taxes. With regard to the fact that tax 
revenues (quasi taxes) are in fact also incomes from the obligatory payments to social welfare, 
contributions to state unemployment policy and obligatory payments to health insurance 
system, the relevant indicator for international comparison is the compound tax quota that 
also includes these incomes. Compound tax quota (CTQ) is calculated as “proportion of 
revenue from tax, duty and payments to health insurance and social welfare systems to GDP” 
in current prices. 
Compound tax quota = tax revenues + quasi taxes / GDP * 100 [%] 
As it results from the formula, basic factors affecting value of tax quota is the amount 
of gross domestic product and volume of taxes collected6.  Total effective burden is regularly 
monitored by Eurostat and published in the form of tax quota. 
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 For tax quota in detail see SZAROWSKÁ (2008, pp. 168-77) 
  
4.3 Tax Quota and Its Development 
Total effective burden is regularly monitored by Eurostat and published in the form of 
tax quota. In 2006 compound tax quota in the European Union reached its average value of 
37.1 per cent, which is higher by twelve per cent than in the US or Japan. Similar 
development may have been observed since the 1970s when there was an increase in the 
1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s, and the main reason for this was mainly the need to 
cover higher and higher public expenditures. This problem of expanding state activity is 
described by so-called Wagner´s law7. After the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact8 were adopted, there were changes in fiscal policies of some countries related to 
the effort to accept Euro, and subsequently there was decrease of public expenditures, which 
was indirectly projected also by decrease of compound tax quota. 
Figure 6 Compound tax quota in the EU in % GDP ( in 2006) 
 
Source: The author´s own compilation according to Eurostat data   
What is important is not only amount of the indicator observed but value and ratio of 
individual components as well. According to the structure of tax quota, i.e. according to the 
fact which taxes bring the highest incomes into the public budgets, member states of the 
European Union may be divided into three groups. The following table shows that in sixteen 
countries the main source of public revenues are indirect taxes, i.e. taxation of consumption. 
In six countries the highest revenues come from direct taxes (mainly personal and corporate 
incomes taxes) and in five countries the basic source of public budgets are payments for social 
welfare9. 
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 After Adolf Wagner, a German economist of the 19th century. When incomes per capita increase in the 
economy, relative size of public sector also grows. The base of this statement was empirical. Wagner observed 
growth of public sector in many European countries, the United States and Japan in the 19th century. Forces 
causing these movements in proportion of public expenditures to GNP were explained in connection to political 
and economic factors. Wagner explained the existence of services of public sector, such as legal services, police 
and banking, by increasing complexity of manufacturing relations. Banking, provided by state banks, is to 
connect those who offer surplus funds with those who have the best opportunities to invest. Growth of public 
expenditures on education, recreation and culture, health and welfare was explained by Wagner with regard to 
their income elasticity of demand. For Wagner these services represented superior or income-elastic needs. 
Therefore, together with growth of real incomes in the economy (i.e. with increase of GNP) there is an increase 
in public expenditures on these services more than proportionally, which is explained by an increasing 
proportion of government expenditures to GNP. 
8
 The Stability and Growth Pact is an agreement between members of the Eurozone regarding coordination of 
their budget policies so as not to threaten stability of Euro or to increase inflation in the Eurozone in case of 
possible high deficits of state budgets. The agreement partly applies to states of the European Union that have 
not accepted Euro as its currency. 
9
 When we compare development in the Czech Republic with OECD countries we find, that social insurance 
creates a decisive share of tax revenues in almost all OECD countries. OECD publication explains the increasing 
Table 2 Division of EU countries according to the main tax resource in 2006 
Main Source of Tax Revenues 
Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes Social Contributions 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus,  
Lithuania, Latvia,  Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, Portugal, Austria, Romania, 
Greece, Slovenia, Spain 
Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland,  Luxembourg, 
Sweden,  United 
Kingdom 
Czech Republic, 
France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Slovakia 
Source: The author´s compilation according to Eurostat data   
Figure 7 displays the average shares of revenues raised from direct and indirect taxes 
and social contributions across the European Union. It also confirms a standard, generally 
used economic rule which prefers indirect taxes10 to direct ones. As points Široký (2009) high 
income taxes may discourage employees from earning more and force companies to take their 
profits into countries with the lowest tax rates. Therefore, many economists claim that the best 
taxes for the economy are those from consumption. Their level may threaten groups with low 
incomes but this may be compensated by special social benefits. Moreover, they are 
transparent11. 
Figure 7 Average EU revenue by major type of tax (in 2006) 
 
Source: The author´s compilation based on Eurostat data   
However, individual Member States have very different structures according to the 
type of tax. New Member States tend to rely to a smaller extent on direct taxation. Direct 
taxes only account for around 20 % of total revenues in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia 
while they represent more than 60 % in Denmark. The share of indirect taxes varies from 
30 % in the Czech Republic and Belgium to 56.5 % in Bulgaria. Social contributions only 
bring 2 % of total revenues in Denmark, but 44 % in the Czech Republic12. 
Figure 8 shows development and changes in structure of compound tax quota in 
Member States in years 1995 and 2006. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
share (from 18 per cent in 1965 to 26 per cent in 2003) mainly by pressure on increase of social transfers related 
to increasing unemployment, aging population and greater government expenses on health service. 
10
 Indirect taxes are value added tax, excise tax, duty and other indirect taxes. 
11
 Direct taxes are imposed on a concrete subject that may not transfer this tax on somebody else, e.g. income 
tax. Indirect taxes are also imposed on a concrete subject, but may be transferred on another one. 
12
 For details see Taxation trends in the European Union (2008) 
Figure 8 Components of compound tax quota in the EU in % GDP 
 
Source: The author´s compilation based on Eurostat data   
 Although taxes are cross-cutting tool connected to many sectors of public life and 
government policy (i.e. social policy, environmental policy, education, health), the main task 
is still to ensure sufficient revenues for financing public goods and services. Each government 
must choose the own tax strategy and create efficient  system of taxes (so called tax mix). 
Globalization and other socio - economic changes are reflected in changes in the preference of 
the structure of tax revenues. Next figure decomposes the change in the overall tax burden 
into (positive or negative) changes of its three major components.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Evolution by major type of taxes 1995-2006, differences in % of GDP  
 
Source: Taxation Trends in the European Union (2008) 
The black line shows the change in the overall tax to GDP for all the countries. The 
figure highlights that, in the period under consideration, Member States only shifted taxation 
from one type of taxes to another. Examples of changes in the tax mix are the Czech Republic 
and Poland, which shifted the burden of taxation from taxes to social contributions, and 
France, Slovenia, Latvia, and the Netherlands, which did the opposite. Bulgaria and Romania, 
too, shifted taxation in a clear way towards indirect taxation, but this is not virble in the figure 
owing to the lack of data for 1995. In more recent years, there has been a lively discussion 
about the merits of a shift towards indirect taxes, and such a measure was taken, for instance, 
in Germany in 2007, when part of a VAT increase was used to finance a cut in social security 
contributions.  
The present tax policy of the EU prefers revenue from indirect taxes (e.g. VAT and 
excise taxes), value of indirect taxes has continuously increased since 2001.  Development of 
revenue from direct taxes has been  fluctuating. On the other hand, the value of revenue from 
quasi taxes, mainly from social welfare payments, has a steady  development in the countries 
of the European Union and it only decreases very slowly.  
5. Conclusions 
With growing globalization and internationalization, the level of tax burden is often 
discussed. In economic theory there are two basic opinions of level of tax burden and 
approaches to tax burden and competition and its impact on capital flows, economic activity 
and tax base. The first opinion prefers tax competition and „tax game“ because of positive 
effects on public expenditure, reducing of noneffective activities. The second opinion  
highlights the impact of tax competition in a negative way and prefers tax harmonization and 
puts stress on negative influence of capital mobility on capital tax rates and level on public 
expenditure.  
For comparison of tax burden, the easiest way is to use statutory tax rates but the result 
may be rather inaccurate. More convenient way of comparison is comparing implicit tax rates 
that consider not only size of statutory tax rates but also other aspects of tax systems 
determining total amount of effectively paid taxes. Eurostat has used implicit tax rates for 
evaluation of structure of a tax system since 1995. In this way, we may express impact of 
taxes on economic activities according to their functions (work, capital, consumption). 
Published data show current trends in the tax policy of the European Union. It is obvious that 
in the EU the labour implicit tax rate is higher than capital and consumption tax rates. Labour 
is taxed above average especially because it is not much mobile, compared to other 
production factors. The capital implicit tax rate does not fall, but it tends to rise in the long 
term in spite of decreasing nominal rates. The reason for this is expansion of tax base and 
partially the impact of fight against tax evasions. The lowest is the consumption implicit 
taxation when the reasons may be social reasons as well as the fact that consumption is easier 
to be taxed and possibility of tax evasion is lower than in case of more mobile tax bases - 
labour and capital.  
The complex indicator providing an international comparison of tax burden is a tax 
quota that compares total implicit taxation in individual countries by measuring a proportion 
of effectively collected taxes on gross domestic product. Total effective burden is also 
regularly monitored and published by Eurostat. Research has proven that value of tax quota 
falls in time and indirect taxes prevail over the direct ones. In sixteen countries of the EU 
main resources of public revenues are nowadays indirect taxes, i.e. taxation of consumption. 
In six countries the greatest revenues come from direct taxes (especially personal and 
corporate income taxes) and in five countries the basic source of public budgets are payments 
for social welfare. In the process of decreasing taxes, thus increasing competitive advantages 
over the neighbouring states, the most active countries are those in the Middle and East 
Europe. Both trends mentioned above appear in the member state of the European Union to 
various extent. When assessing countries according to statistical data, we find great 
differences not only in tax quota but especially in its structure and construction of individual 
taxes. 
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